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I. INTRODUCTION
Just as Rachel Carson's classic Silent Spring awakened the world to
environmental pollution in 1962, Larry Lessig's insightful Code and Other
Laws of Cyberspace' (Code) seeks to warn longtime inhabitants of
cyberspace of a major danger to the wild, unregulated, "1960s-like"
environments to which they have grown accustomed. Code challenges the
presumption of early Internet heroes, like John Perry Barlow, that
technology has created an inherently free environment that can only remain
so if governments leave it alone. Code observes, rather, that cyberspace is
quite susceptible to alteration and that the gravest threats to online civil
liberties in the United States are posed, not by laws, but by computer
* Attorney/Advisor, Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Mr. Nadel
received his B.A. from Amherst College and his J.D. from Harvard University. The views
expressed in this Book Review are those of the Author and do not necessarily represent the
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code-particularly those designed to commercialize the Web for e-
commerce.
Code explains how the business community's efforts (with
government support) to make it easier to confirm cyberspace buyers'
identities also unintentionally facilitate regulation of other conduct.
Lessig's particular concern is with those civil liberties and other values
central to American society, that the framers of the Constitution left
without explicit legal protection; the limits of the technology of the time
already safeguarded them. Now that the Internet and other new media have
eliminated many physical and economic constraints on intrusive conduct-
like the tracking of every page that an Internet surfer views-Code pleads
for citizens to defend those privacy and other values they consider
fundamental, lest they be diminished-if not eliminated-by code.
In fact, the introduction of e-commerce-friendly Internet code is
somewhat analogous to the genetic engineering of agricultural products. As
Europeans-and increasingly Americans-have come to recognize, the
manipulation of such basic codes may have widespread effects not limited
2to their targeted product markets or by national boundaries. This has led
many to demand public debate on the issue of what many call
"Frankenfoods," and its effects on world ecosystems and human health.
While Lessig certainly does not oppose e-commerce code, he advocates
Collective decision making where code may have major consequences with
respect to important societal liberties.
From an economist's perspective, Lessig understands that the
"externalities" of e-commerce code-in terms of harm to social values-
are too significant to expect private sector code writers to design a socially
optimal architecture guided solely by Adam Smith's invisible hand. Rather,
democratic principles require that, prior to the adoption of important
varieties of what he terms "West Coast [computer] code,"3 there be public
discussions comparable to those associated with the adoption of "East
Coast [legal] code."4 Decisions about how much control over information
society wants to allow and by whom, call for democratic decision making.
2. See, e.g., LuKE ANDERSON, GENERIC ENGINEERING: FOOD AND OUR ENVIRONMENT
(1999); Carey Goldberg, 1500 March in Boston to Protest Biotech Food, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
27, 2000, at A14 (D.C. ed.); Donald McNeil, Protest on New Genes and Seeds Grow More
Passionate in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at Al; Michael Pollan, Feeding Frenzy,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999 § 6, at 43.
3. This is the computer code most frequently written in Silicon Valley, California, and
Redmond, Washington. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 53.
4. This is the legal code that Congress enacts (e.g., the tax code, the Code of Federal
Regulations). See LESSIr, supra note 1, at 53.
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With concerns similar to those of political activist Jeremy Rifkin,5 Lessig
implores citizens not to maintain blind faith in the social value judgments
of the commercial marketplace where externalities may be given short
shrift, if not ignored altogether, until irreversible harm is done.
While Code focuses on issues arising from Internet technology, it also
discusses the more general relationship between technology and law. Code
observes that four principal forces regulate people's behavior: laws, norms,
prices, and technology (although it calls the latter forces "market" and
"architecture"). It explains how each of these limit individuals' actions,
how the forces can work directly or indirectly in combinations, and how
improvements in technology can dramatically alter the composite
constraint on people's conduct. The middle third of Code is entirely
devoted to identifying how technology-primarily the Internet-is
significantly altering the net effect of these four forces on behaviors. In
particular, as technological progress has dramatically lowered the economic
costs of collecting and controlling information, liberties resulting from the
"inefficiencies" of previous technologies are now vulnerable to elimination.
Society must now reexamine these behaviors and decide whether it wants
to prohibit, encourage, or tolerate them.
Although Lessig does not lack ideas for responding to the dangers he
identifies, he is not particularly concerned with identifying the best
solution. His primary and overriding goal is to raise and clarify important
questions and to urge careful discussion, analysis, and decision making
concerning intellectual property, privacy, free speech, and sovereignty.
Thus, Code highlights the best insights and arguments of those individuals
whom Lessig recognizes as experts on each issue.6 Unfortunately, Code is
very pessimistic about the ability of society, including the three branches of
government and the public, to take appropriate action.
Code observes that, historically, the courts have served to protect
liberties. When new technologies threaten liberties, courts can quickly
preserve them by "translating" the Constitution into the present context in
order to preserve the framers original meaning.7 In many cases, however,
Lessig finds that technological changes are revealing "latent ambiguities"
5. See, e.g., Ted Rose, Jeremy Rifln: Agent Provocateur, INDusTRY STANDARD, Mar.
20,2000, at 193.
6. Lessig also often includes lengthy footnotes that resemble minibiblographies of
those experts' writings on the topic.
7. Code illustrates this with the example of the Court's decision in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), recognizing protection of an individual's "expectation of
privacy" and overturning the originalism approach of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928). LESSIG, supra note 1, at 116-17.
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in constitutional law-questions that cannot be resolved by translation or
any other bona fide approach to constitutional interpretations.
Even in these cases, when the Constitution proves unhelpful, Lessig
urges the hundreds of bright and creative federal judges to participate more
actively in the debate on these issues of constitutional dimensions when
faced with relevant cases. He begs judges to analyze the issues and resolve
them in favor of the best public policy results and to "kvetch" about their
inability to apply that analysis if they find an issue of liberty to be a
nonjusticiable political matter. Ideally, he would ask judges to go so far as
to adopt the approach proposed by former professor, now judge, Guido
Calabresi, of resolving such issues in a way most likely to induce a
democratic response. Acknowledging that many ridicule this approach,
Lessig nevertheless prefers to "err on the side of harmless activism than on
the side of debilitating passivity."' Yet he does not expect his advice to be
heeded.
Lessig is a little more optimistic about the ability of the legislative
and executive branches to resolve these important matters.
One would have thought that collective choices were problems of
governance. Yet very few of us would want government to make these
choices. Government seems the solution to no problem we have, and
we should understand why this is.
... We believe, rightly or not, that [our legislative] processes have
been captured by special interests more concerned with individual than
collective values. Although we believe that there is a role for collective
judgments, we are repulsed by the idea of placing the design of
something as important as the Internet into the hands of governments.
Despite this despair, however, Lessig is no libertarian. In fact, as its
last chapter expressly announces, Code is clearly a clarion call to Internet
libertarian activists, like Declan McCullagh,' ° whose reflexive opposition
to (and focus on) government appears to blind them to the harms to liberty
from the actions of e-commerce firms. "If we hate government, it is
because we have grown tired of our own government. We have grown
weary of its betrayals, its games, the interests that control it."" But Lessig
ultimately concludes that "[w]e must find a way to get over it' 2 for he
8. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 223.
9. Id. at 219.
10. Declan McCullagh is a smart, young writer for WIRED NEws who also runs a widely
read listserve e-mail list. See id. at 231.
11. Id. at 220.
12. Id.
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recognizes that the need for collectivist action necessitates a role for the
government.
Lessig's attempt to spread his important message to a wide audience
leads him to keep Code relatively concise. Unfortunately, this leads him to
omit much useful historical perspective on how the government has
regulated other media, including the postal service, the telephone industry,
and cable television system operators. These would provide a particularly
helpful context for his chapter on free speech. Fortunately, readers can
already obtain such background from Ithiel de Sola Pool's marvelously
readable Technologies of Freedom.13 Similarly, Lessig's apparent desire to
publish Code while it can still affect public policy has diminished his
attention to solutions which might have encouraged him to be more
optimistic. Still, he is likely to remedy this latter deficiency in due time
with a regular column for the weekly magazine, The Industry Standard,14 as
well as a Web site for the book, 5 which permits readers to communicate
with him directly and help him nurture fresh approaches to the problems
Code describes.
Renowned sociologist Daniel Bell likens Code to a Stanley Kubrick
film,16 and this reader also sensed a bit of cinematic crafting (whether
intentional or not), including frequent surprising and fascinating twists and
turns. One almost hesitates to quote Code's best punch lines in a review for
fear of diminishing the full effect of the book on a new reader. Like a
sophisticated musical composition, Code introduces four interesting stories
in the second chapter 17 and uses them as recurring themes throughout the
book. There is also the mysterious appearance of the characters he calls
Una Smiths, extremely knowledgeable female nonstudents, who appear to
have served as the critical catalyst to class discussions.'8 If Code was
fiction, one would be inclined to speculate about their symbolic
significance.
In addition to providing an engaging introduction to the Internet for
those with little knowledge of its jargon and history, Code provides
amusing anecdotes about MUDs, MOOs, and hackers. 9 For example, Code
13. See ITmL DESOLAPOOL, TECHNOLOGIES OFFREEDOM (1983).
14. See The Standard (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://www.thestandard.com>.
15. See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (visited Mar. 29, 2000)
<http://www.code-is-law.org/main.html>.
16. See Jacket (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://www.code-is-law.org/jacket.html>.
17. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 9.
18. Seeid. at81.
19. MUD has had a number of different meanings. Originally, it stood for Multi-User
Dungeon or Multi-User Domain. MUDS are cyberspace environments somewhat like virtual
worlds, where individuals interact in various ways in an artificially constructed
Number 3)
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explains why the damaging worm released by Cornell graduate student
Robert Tappin Morris was of a "sorcerer's apprentice"-like accident-
otherwise consistent with reasonable hacker etiquette-than with a criminal
act.20 Finally, Code repeatedly orients the reader by recapping material
previously covered and previewing what is still to come, thereby helping
readers appreciate the full landscape of the book and how the individual
elements fit together.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Lessig's discussion of the Internet's effect on intellectual property is a
particularly enlightening review of cutting edge thinking in this area. He
notes that when the Clinton administration evaluated the Internet's impact
on intellectual property, it saw the need to give additional protection to
authors against potential infringers. Ira Magaziner's 1995 White Paper
promised "to strengthen law in every area it can ...approach[ing] the
question like a ship battening down for a storm-whatever happens, the
threat to copyright is real, damage will be done, and the best we can do is
ride it out."'', Most Internet users familiar with computers and the Internet
would probably agree with the White Paper's perspective and that of the
recent front page headline in the New York Times: "Potent Software
Escalates Music Industry Jitters."2 They would initially be shocked by
Lessig's view one-hundred-eighty degrees to the contrary.
Code asserts that technology will empower authors to prevent Internet
users from retrieving any content unless they are using a "trusted system"
Web browser that will control whether content can be read, printed, or
electronically copied.2 Those systems will give authors permanent power
to charge users for every use of the content. "We are... entering a time
when copyright is more effectively protected than at any time since
Gutenberg... cyberspace is about to give holders of copyrighted property
the biggest gift of protection they have ever known."
24
Of course, as Code recognizes, even technology as powerful as
trusted systems cannot be fully effective without help from laws like the
environment, although they are text based, with no pictures. MOOs are MUDs Object-
Oriented. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 11. Lessig also provides references to the history of
MUDs. See id. at 242 n.4.
20. See id. at 195.
21. Id. at 126-27.
22. See Amy Harmon, Potent Softvare Escalates Music Industry Jitters, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2000, at Al.
23. See LSSIG, supra note 1, at 127-30.
24. Id. at 127.
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act,2 which makes it a felony to attempt to
circumvent a copyright protection mechanism.26 Absent East Coast code's
support, West Coast code is wide open to attack from hackers. For
example, when a Dutch student posted a program capable of decrypting a
digital video disk (DVD) so it could be viewed on an unlicensed player, the
DVD Copy Control Association filed suit.27
In any case, Code reverses the traditional legal question of how law
can aid in the protection of authors to ask, instead, whether such protection
may soon be too great. "The problem will center not on copy-right but on
copy-duty---the duty of owners of protected property to make that property
accessible." As Code explains, information is a unique form of property
not only because it is a nonexclusive form of property-it can be shared by
others without denying the creator full use-but because it is an input to
other intellectual property. Consequently, granting excessive intellectual
property protection can inhibit innovations that build on such "property."
29
And this harm is compounded by the apparent willingness of both the
under-staffed U.S. Patent Office and the courts to grant and enforce patents
on what should be considered "obvious" new Internet business practices.' °
Code recognizes the need for some private property, but observes that if
technology shifts the balance too far toward private control, diminishing
contributions to the "public commons" for use by all, then research and
development, innovation, and therefore economic, scientific, cultural, and
even political growth will suffer. The key is setting the proper balance
between public and private property. 3'
Although limiting creators' rights to their intellectual property may
sound a bit socialist, the economic efficiency of the result is recognized by
economists of all stripes. These include University of Chicago
25. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 112 Stat. 2877 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)
(1998)).
26. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 264 n.19.
27. See, e.g., Carl Kaplan, DVD Lawsuit Questions Legality of Linking, N.Y. TIMES ON
THE WEB (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/0l/cyber/
cyberlaw/07law.html>. In both California and New York, the industry associations or their
members have won preliminary injunctions against these defendants, blocking them from
distributing the program. The DVDCCA and MPAA members are now pressing to make
those injunctions permanent. A third action, with no preliminary injunction, is ongoing in
Connecticut. See Openlaw on Open DVD (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://eon.law.
Harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/>
28. LESsIG, supra note 1, at 127.
29. Id. at 186.
30. See, e.g, Larry Lessig, The Problems with Patents, INDusTRY STANDARD, Apr. 23,
1999, at paras. 4-5, available at (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <www.thestandard.con/article/
article.printl,1 153,4296,00.html>.
31. See LEsSIG, supra note 1, at 131.
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32heavyweights Richard Posner and William Landes, as well as Justice
Stephen Breyer, whose seminal 1970 Harvard Law Review article
questioned the case for any copyrights at all.3 Lessig goes so far as to
interpret the Constitution's special provision on intellectual property as
actually limiting the authority of Congress to grant any greater copyright
protection than that necessary to ensure that intellectual property is created
and spread through the land.34 Thus, he is part of a group challenging the
constitutionality of the recent Sonny Bono Act, which extends the standard
term of copyright protection by twenty years to ninety-five years.35 "[W]e
protect intellectual property only to ensure that we create a sufficient
incentive to produce it."
36
Il. FREE SPEECH
Code discusses three interesting First Amendment issues. First, it
observes that, because the architecture of the system now gives anyone the
power to publish, quickly, and ubiquitously,37 the current nature of
cyberspace eliminates the need for legal protection against prior restraint.
38
This provides an excellent example of how the architecture of cyberspace
can serve to strengthen civil liberties in an important way.
Second, Code considers which is the least dangerous architecture for
regulating "speech harmful to minors."39 Lessig begins by criticizing the
1996 Communications Decency Act as "[a] law of extraordinary
stupidity,"4 and condemns the 1998 Child Online Protection Act (COPA)4
32. See id. at 265-66 n.38.
33. See id. at 263 n.5.
34. See id. at 133.
35. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (challenging the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827). For more information on the Sonny Bono Act, which would
amend 17 U.S.C. § 304 and extend the standard copyright term to 95 years, see Openlaw:
Eldred v. Reno (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://eon.law.harvard.edulopenlaw/
eldredvreno.html>.
36. LESSiG, supra note 1, at 133.
37. Although Lessig says "anonymously" instead of "ubiquitously," it appears that it is
the former, not the latter, that is crucial to defeating government efforts to stifle
instantaneous publication. For a discussion between Mr. Nadel and Mr. Lessig on this issue,
see Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace: Chap 12 Free Speech: Prior Restraint (visited
Mar. 31, 2000) <http://bcis.law.harvard.edu:8081/-Code/guests>.
38. See LEsSIG, supra note 1, at 170 (citing Floyd Abrams, First Amendment Postcards
From the Edge of Cyberspace, 4 ST. JOHNS LEGAL COMM. 693, 699 (1996)).
39. Id. at 263 n.5.
40. Id. at 174.
41. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. 11I 1997).
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as a similarly constitutionally troubled form of a "zoning" approach.42
Surprisingly, though, rather than championing the nongovernmental,
individual-based mechanism of filters, Lessig favors a type of zoning
regime as less intrusive.43 Code concludes that the least offensive option is
a law requiring that Web sites offering speech deemed harmful to minors
must reject requests from users whose browsers identify them as minors. 4
4
Still, Code's rejection of filters as too dangerous is unfairly critical.
Lessig explains that the architecture supporting filtering permits
governments to use filters to censor;45 there is certainly a genuine risk of
such conduct by some foreign governments.4 6 Yet, in the United States, the
First Amendment appears adequate to prohibit government censorship, as
Code would likely have recognized had it examined the issue of Internet
filtering by public libraries.47 The same constraints on government
discretion over content decisions would seem to clearly apply to any
governmental use of filters.
Code's suggestion that filters are more surreptitious than zoning is
also a bit misleading.48 It observes that because a filtering regime permits
blocking to occur without the access seeker's knowledge, it does not allow
the same chance to challenge the block as a zoning regime would provide.49
But one typing in the URL of a particular page will immediately discover
any blockage and have the same opportunity to appeal under either a
zoning or filtering regime.
Lessig's strongest opposition to filtering is based on his fear that
filters will be used for much more than simply excluding content harmful
to minors. He expects that the proliferation of filters will enable and
encourage much of the public to adopt the same socially harmful perfect
filtering as "[t]he very rich [who] can cut themselves off from what they do
not want to see."' O Lessig fears that embracing filtering may increase
fragmentation in society, and he quotes a related point by Ithiel de Sola
42. LEsSIG, supra note 1, at 177.
43. For a detailed discussion of this position, see Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick,
Zoning Speech on the Internet. A Legal and Technical Model, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 395 (1999).
44. See LEsiG, supra note 1, at 181.
45. See id. at 178.
46. E-mail could, however, at least partially defeat this.
47. See, e.g., Mark Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet
Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEx
L.REv. 1121 (forthcoming Apr. 2000).
48. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 179.
49. See id
50. Id. at 180.
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Pool at length.5' He clearly fears that perfect filters will lead individuals to
completely screen out disagreeable viewpoints, leaving those individuals to
see nothing except their own, specially edited subsets of reality. Such
fragmentation, according to Cass Sunstein, will increase polarization, 52
thereby endangering society's ability to maintain the unified United States
envisioned by the Founding Fathers.
Yet, there are many reasons why the issue of perfect filtering appears
to be a red herring. Lessig observes that in real space "[a]ll sorts of issues
I'd rather not think about force themselves on me," and that the
technological inefficiency of real space is important because "it would be
terrible if citizens could simply tune out problems that were not theirs." 53
Although this is correct, Lessig's implicit premises appear to be (1) that
Internet filters would permit perfect fitering, and (2) that if individuals
could afford it, most would choose narrowly filtered information. Both
seem to be inconsistent with the available evidence.
First, it must be noted that even the rich and powerful cannot achieve
anything approaching perfect filtering in real space, and all individuals
using the Internet must also function in real space. While hermits may
approach perfect filtering, anyone who wants to sample the latest culture
(interesting new films, books, etc.) is likely to stumble upon some upsetting
views. Even those able to avoid direct content with disturbing views are
likely to be exposed to them indirectly when mixing with others at clubs,
parties, houses of worship, etc. In addition, most parents will face questions
when their children mention issues discussed in schools, with friends, or
seen on television. Furthermore, when those children mature and their
biological code creates a psychological need to assert independence, they
are likely to challenge their parents with some opposing views. Even
absolute dictators like Saddam Hussein seem incapable of achieving perfect
filtering. As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman has recognized,
once a nation-even a dictatorship-participates in the world economy, it
is likely to face, and be hard pressed to resist, political and economic
criticisms and pressures from the global capital markets. 
4
Second, there is the question of whether individuals have any real
desire for perfect filtering. When Pool expressed his concern about
fragmentation, he was concerned about the expansion of cable channels.
51. See id.
52. See Cass Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, University of Chicago Law
School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 91, Dec. 1999, available at
(visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstractjd=199668>.
53. LEssIG, supra note 1, at 180.
54. See THoMAs FRIEDMAN, THE LExus AND THE OLivE TREE 93-119 (1999).
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Yet, despite the more than two hundred different cable television
networks and the approximately ten thousand different specialized
magazines published in the United States, the resulting fragmentation has
not yielded anything approaching perfect filtering. In fact, it seems that
most people feel some obligation to gain at least limited exposure to some
discomforting, if not disagreeable, social issues, for example, from their
spiritual/religious leaders (in sermons). They also seem to prefer
publications that help them understand an issue by presenting different
sides of it-at least in the letters to the editor, if not op-ed pages-and most
also seem to sample content from multiple specialized sources. Few seem
to want to limit themselves to a single narrow perspective on the news of
the day while remaining ignorant of all others.
In any case, the best way to address any harm caused by the inevitable
increase in filtering is probably for society to make substantial efforts to
unite communities through integrating activities that mix otherwise
segregated segments and foster bona fide dialogues. 57 In real space, this
would include school systems that encourage multicultural efforts and
religious leaders who seek to foster understanding of other faiths. In
addition, community groups, like the League of Women Voters, or local
media can seek to sponsor debates and "town hall"-like meetings in
conjunction with local, state, and/or national elections, as well as
sponsoring community Web sites for discussions.
Certainly filtering is a powerful tool, which, although subject to
possible abuse, has long been embraced (in the form of media editors)
because it also yields major benefits. For example, filters can empower
parents to transform their television sets into "edutainment" centers for
their children, by filtering out everything except that designated "high
quality" by expert editors. Parents could choose such editors in the same
58
manner that they currently choose a magazine or babysitter. While there is
a danger that use of such filters could pass on parental prejudices, 9 well-
55. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Sixth Annual Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 978, 983 (2000).
56. This is one way to interpret the Sunstein position of fostering diversity, which
Lessig supports. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMoCRACY AND THE PROBLEMS OF FREE SPEECH 21
(1993).
57. According to Daniel Yankelovich, a bona fide dialogue requires equality and the
absence of coercive influences, listening with empathy, and bringing assumptions into the
open. See DANIEL YANKELOVICH, THE MAGIC OF DIALOGUE 41-46 (1999).
58. See Mark Nadel, Empower Parents to Choose Quality Children's Television, 19 1.
PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGmr. 145 (2000). Another advantage of using such a marketplace
solution is that the FCC would not have to judge which content met its three hours per week
of "educational programming" standard.
59. This concern is passionately expressed in the song You've Got to Be Carefully
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designed filters ° could also stimulate the TV production market to produce
more high quality programming.
Finally, Code addresses the constitutionality of media licensing. "Two
hundred years after the framers ratified the Constitution, the Net has taught
us what the First Amendment means. If we take this meaning seriously,
then the First Amendment will require a fairly radical restructuring of the
architectures of speech off the Net as well.",61 Code observes that the
"anyone can publish"-architecture of the Internet resembles the period
when publishing a newspaper was also relatively low cost.6 He then
considers the significance of a spread spectrum broadcast technology that
would permit multiple broadcasters to use the same frequency band at the
same time in the same place without interference. He concludes that the
First Amendment would prohibit an exclusive licensing regime in that
context for, prohibiting the unnecessary licensing of publishers is the most
basic element of "freedom of the press."64
Although Code's conclusion is logically accurate and relies on longer
articles by Yocha Benkler and Eli Noam for support, Code does not
respond to Thomas Hazlett's significant challenges to a key technical
aspect of the idea concerning congestion.6 While Lessig and Benkler point
to transportation highways and the Internet as metaphors for how
broadcasting should operate, both of those media tolerate delays when there
is heavy congestion. While this might be the best result for transportation
networks, many have argued that policymakers will need to find a better
property rights structure (pricing mechanism and/or code/architecture) for
avoiding delays on the Internet.
Additional historical context would also be particularly helpful on
another free speech/access issue that Code does not discuss, but on which
Taught from the Broadway musical South Pacific.
60. For a model of a better class of filters, see J.M. Balkin et al., Filtering the Internet:
A Best Practices Model, in PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN ON THE INTERNET: TowARDS A NEW
CULTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY (Jens Walterman & Marcel Machill, eds.) (forthcoming 2000),
available at (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http:llwww.law.yale.edu/infosociety/filtering
_jeport.html>.
61. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 167.
62. Id. at 183.
63. See id. at 184.
64. See, e.g., WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 69
(1984).
65. See Yochai Benider, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J. L. & TEcH. 287 (1998); Eli Noam, Spectrum
Auctions Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's Anachronism: Taking the
Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765 (1998).
66. See, e.g., Thomas Hazlett, Spectrum Flash Dance: Eli Noam's Proposal for "Open
Access" to Radio Waves, 41 J.L. & EcON. 805, 815 (1998).
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Lessig became very vocal in late 1999: the issue of "open access" by
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to cable television system cable modem
links. Despite the clear and compelling legal and economic analysis in
favor of "end-to-end" access that Lessig and Mark Lemley filed with the
Federal Communications Commission,67 both Code and that analysis omit
any discussion of a comparable cable TV access issue from the 1970s. Six
serious 1970 studies of how to structure cable television systems-by
liberals and conservatives-all concluded that cable operators should be
required to lease most, if not all, of their channels to unaffiliated program
suppliers on a nondiscriminatory basis.6 Nor does either note that
newspaper and cable companies eagerly joined together to require that
local telephone companies provide all of their electronic publishing
facilities to others (like newspaper publishers) for seven years to protect
open access to local telephone networks.69
IV. SOVEREIGNTY, ET AL.
Lessig uses Vietnam to illustrate that regulation cannot function
without a technology of control. Although Vietnam is a communist
country-and thus highly regulated-
the architecture of life in Vietnam clearly makes any real regulation by
the state [for ordinary people] impossible. There is no infrastructure of
control ....
... [T]he power to regulate is a function of architecture as much as
of ideology; architectures enable regulation ....
•.. To understand a state's power to regulate we must ask: How
well does its infrastructure support a structure of regulation."
70
To inhibit state control, one can try to disable the infrastructure it
relies on, but overturning the state does not guarantee individual freedom,
as Lessig repeatedly illustrates with references to the aftermath of
communism in Eastern Europe. Cyberspace environments that function
effectively subject only to social norms may be ideal, but Lessig's stories
67. See In the Matter of AT&TIMediaOne Merger (visited Mar. 29, 2000)
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/ MB.html>
68. See Mark Nadel, Cablespeech for Whom?, 4 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 70
n.104 (1985).
69. See United States v. Western Electric, 552 F. Supp. 131, 180-86 (D.D.C. 1982),
affd sub. nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). It is ironic, but not
surprising, that monopoly local newspapers and local monopoly cable system operators took
this position while vigorously claiming their own First Amendment rights against
government efforts to force them to share any part of their distribution facilities with others.
See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (newspapers); GEORGE
SHAPiRo, Pimup KuRnAND & JAMES MERCURiO, CABLEsPEEcH: THE CASE FOR FIRST
AMENDmENT PROTECTION (1983) (cable television systems).
70. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 189.
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of such "garden of Eden" environments both end with attacks by snakes.7'
And Code predicts that the absence of East Coast code "will cause a shift in
effective regulatory power-from law to code, from sovereigns to
software.
' 72
Code reminds libertarians that liberty does not follow from the
absence of government, but rather, "government is necessary to help
establish the conditions necessary for liberty to exist.... The freedom to
contract, to own property, to travel, to vote-all of these rights require
massive governmental support."73  The architectures designed for
cyberspace "are political in the most ordinary way: they are structures that
order real life, and they ought therefore to be structures that we have in
some sense chosen." 74 "There is a proper space for collective life and an
important space for private life. A good constitution helps us navigate that
balance." 75
Code is clear that the basis for action should be accountability and
that this is probably best served by requiring transparent laws and open
code. The latter makes it much more difficult for regulation to occur
surreptitiously and much easier for resistance to arise against inappropriate
controls. Although Lessig recognizes the occasional advantage of closed
code, he believes that "the best code (from the perspective of constitutional
values) is both modular and open,' 76 even if the current structure of
copyright protection for software discourages modular structures and
prefers opaque to transparent code.
V. SOLUTIONS
This reader's greatest disappointment with Code is its failure to
devote more attention and creativity to potential solutions to the problems
of governance in an Internet age.77 This omission may be excusable given
Lessig's apparent desire to proclaim his warning before difficult-to-reverse
decisions are made. Yet it is still unfortunate that Code does not include
71. These include Mr. Bungle's attack on LamdaMOO and IBEX's attack on Lessig's
Yale Law School class community. See id. at 75-75, 80-82.
72. Id. at 206.
73. Id. at 209.
74. Id. at 199.
75. Id. at 208.
76. Id. at 225.
77. Although it is not an Internet issue, Code repeatedly denigrates the potential for
legislative solutions due to the corruption created by current practices of campaign
financing, but fails to reference any of the innovative proposals to address that problem. See,
e.g., Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to
Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998); Jack Hitt, Real
Campaign-Finance Reform, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1999 §6, at 36-37.
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more material on ideas and mechanisms that might harness the tools of
cyberspace to rescue government from the crises it is aggravating if not
creating. In particular, there is the latent ambiguity that Lessig identifies,
which seems to go to the heart of democracy. "Our framers were keen to
design structures that would mediate the views of the people. Democracy..
. was to be deliberative, reflective, and balanced by limitations imposed by
a constitution." 78 The cost of polling technology ensured that it would occur
infrequently so there was no need to guard against the effects of instant and
continuous polling of "[p]eople [who] often have ill-informed or partially
informed views that they simply repeat as judgments 79 The Internet may
further increase the inclination of those without full information to make
uninformed votes.
Code gives some attention to University of Texas Professor James
Fishkin's response to this condition-deliberative pollings--and Fishkin
has commenced a joint project with Lessig's Berkman Center for Internet
and Society.8' It will be very interesting to see what architectures and
processes arise out of that experiment. Others that are exploring or
implementing new ways to use the Internet to improve the democratic
process include the Benton Foundation's Debate America, Tracy
Westen's Democracy Network (now part of www.grassroots.com), 83
George Washington University's Democracy Online Project, 4 and
Intellectualcapitals's VoxCap.com,8 among others. Hopefully, Lessig will
remedy this omission by posting such information on Code's Web site.
78. LEssiG, supra note 1, at 228.
79. Id.; see also YANxELOVICH, supra note 57, at 24 (stating:
mhe American political tradition has long maintained that an informed public is
indispensable to the successful functioning of democracy. Thomas Jefferson held
this conviction. The contemporary press holds it as an article of faith. But is it
really valid? After decades of wrestling with this question, I have come to the
conclusion that such faith is unjustified. The premise that the health of our
democracy depends on a well-informed public is one of those unexamined pieties
that professionals mouth without ever observing close-up how people really make
the judgments on which our society does depend. The United States is a prime
example of a successfully functioning democracy. But it is not a prime example of
a well-informed citizenry.).
80. See LESsIG, supra note 1, at 227.
81. See Deliberative Polling in Cyberspace (visited Mar. 29, 2000)
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/9-10mtgidp.html>.
82. See Benton Foundation, Debate America (visited Mar. 29, 2000)
<http://www.debateamerica.com>.
83. See, e.g., Elizabeth Wasserman, Where the Grassroots Are Greener, INDUSTRY
STANDARD, Mar. 13,2000, at 112.
84. See Democracy Online Privacy (visited Mar. 29, 2000)
<http://www.democracyonline.org>
85. See VoxCap.com (visited Mar. 29, 2000) <http://www.voxcap.com>.
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While it may be difficult to teach older citizens how to best use the Internet
to become better voters, there is good reason to believe that current
students will learn quickly and easily to take advantage of both the
information and the potential for bona fide dialogues.
Another opportunity that cyberspace offers for improving governance
by encouraging dialogue on public issues may arise out of efforts by
universities to improve their ties to their alumni. Schools interested in
fostering relationships between classmates, instructors, and the school
could establish Web site forums for discussions that might be moderated by
instructors or their research assistants. To the extent that alumni missed the
vibrant seminar discussions from their school days, a professor-sponsored
online discussion might be quite attractive. Not only might current students
benefit from reading and participating in such discussions, but alumni
serving in policymaking or legislative positions might discover useful
insights, and brighter students could be permitted to use the forum to
audition for summer or permanent jobs.
Code's dark perspective should not lead readers to believe that
cyberspace, by transferring substantial control from East to West Coast
code, represents the sunset of civil liberties. Rather, hopefully Code will
lead policymakers to reflect on its insights and focus attention on securely
protecting each and every one of the civil liberties that deserve protection.
In addition, one can hope-should expect-that Lessig's future writings
will illuminate new ways for code to be used to enhance a vibrant
democracy in America.
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